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Be aware with a Honeypot 
Stephen Meyer, Ivan Smyth,  
Mark Cummins and Anthony Keane 
Institute of Technology Blanchardstown, Dublin 15, Ireland 
 
Abstract 
The Internet has already become a hostile environment for computers, especially when 
they are directly connected with a public IP address.  We have experienced this hostile 
activity where on an average day; the ITB Honeypot recorded over a thousand 
reconnaissance attacks seeking unauthorised entry onto our private network.  Our 
Honeypot is a basic PC running Windows XP with no services offered and no activity 
from users that would generate traffic.  The Honeypot is running in a passive state on a 
stub-network where all inbound and outbound traffic is recorded at the bridging 
computer to the WAN.  We report on the majority of scans and vulnerability attacks 
that were used and investigate the processes that targeted vulnerable ports and access 
points on the network.    
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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the average time for an unprotected computer to be 
compromised on the Internet now less than two hours.  Here we investigate this claim 
by recording uninvited network activity implemented against our computers that are 
connected directly to the Internet and constitute our Honeynet [1].  As a Honeynet is an 
unadvertised network and does not run applications that initiate Internet traffic, then all 
traffic on a Honeynet is considered malicious and goes through a data control firewall 
that tracks inbound and outbound connections and an intrusion protection system (IPS) 
to prevent any compromised Honeypots from being used to initiate attacks by dropping 
or modifying malicious traffic originating from them. 
 
Vulnerabilities in Networks 
In general, computer networks are composed of devices, applications and protocols.  
The typical devices are switches, routers, servers and client computers.  The 
applications are network and client operation systems, web and email services and 
many other application services that vary depending on the business using the network.  
The communications between devices and applications use standard well known 
protocols [2], many of which have little or no security ability built-in to them.  
Individually and together, these component parts of the network provide a wide ranging 
array of weak points (vulnerabilities) that hackers probe and attack in order to gain 
access and eventually take over computers on the network [3]. 
 
Typical points of attack in a network are: 
1. Poor configuration of router access controls lists that allow leakage through ICMP, 
IP, NetBIOS and can lead to unauthorised access to DMZ servers  
2. Poorly secured remote access points 
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3. Excessive trust relationships in a Domain provide hackers with unauthorised access 
to sensitive information 
4. User or test accounts with weak passwords and excessive privileges 
5. Unpatched, outdated software, default configurations 
6. Lack of accepted and well defined security policies, procedures and guidelines 
7. File and directory access controls 
8. Unauthorised services and programs on hosts 
9. Weak passwords on workstations 
10. Misconfigured Internet server applications and services 
11. Misconfigured or poorly updated firewall 
12. Running unnecessary services like NetBIOS can compromise network 
13. Information leakage can provide attacker with OS type, versions, zone transfers, 
running services, etc. 
14. Inadequate monitoring and detection capabilities at all levels 
 
These are illustrated in figure 1, which shows a typical configuration of a network. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Typical topology of a network with possible weaknesses indicated by 
numbers. 
 
The steps used to exploit a system follow the general methodology of first conducting 
an Active Reconnaissance of the network with the aim of gaining access by attacking 
the operating system or conducting an application level attack, scripts attack or 
targeting default or misconfigurations on the network.  Once inside the attacker will try 
to elevate the privileges of the account to allow them to install a backdoor program that 
will allow future access.  Finally they will cover their tracks in the system by cleaning 
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up log files to remove evidence of their presence.  If an attacker fails to gain access to 
the system, they may initiate a Denial of Service attack to prevent anyone accessing the 
system at all.  
 
Why we need to protect the Network 
Networks are pathways to computers and people use computers to store stuff like 
personal identity, bank, credit card details and purchases made on the Internet.  
Computers store information ubiquitously on people and companies operate their 
businesses with and on computers.  Two recent reports have highlighted concerns with 
the way information is treated on computers and the new threats to businesses. 
 
Researchers at RITS Information Security performed a study in how the Irish 
population dispose of their computers [4] and during this study analysed the contents of 
recycled hard disks bought openly on the market.  The RITS survey found the 
following: 
 
Organisation Identifiable:  In the sample, 33% of the disks originated from the 
corporate sector ranging from large financial institutions, marketing consultancies, 
auctioneers, utility organizations, legal solicitors and mobile communication 
companies.  Information included customer’s names and addresses, invoices, financial 
records of past jobs, emails, organisation charts and other relevant documents relating 
to the organisation.  
 
Personal Information:  62% of the disks were identified as personal computers or home 
user computers and from half of these could identify their previous owner.   This 
included names, addresses, phone numbers, date of birth and in some cases even bank 
records and PPS numbers.   10% of the disks contained PPS numbers.  
Financial: 24% of the disks contained credit card information. Alarmingly one of these 
disks contained a spreadsheet of at least 300 credit card details along with expiry 
numbers, names and addresses. 
 
Passwords:  48% of the disks contained passwords. These ranged from passwords to 
online sites, email sites, mobile phone sites, etc. These passwords were easily retrieved. 
No brute forcing of passwords took place.  
Illegal Material: 57% of the hard disks contained illegal material. 
 
In the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2007 [5] they make the following 
statements:  “The current threat environment is characterised by an increase in data 
theft and data leakage and the creation of malicious code that targets specific 
organisations for information that can be used for financial gain” and that “Attackers 
are now refining their methods and consolidating their assets to create global networks 
that support coordinated criminal activity” 
 
This heightened activity in criminal behavior on the Internet is fuelled by the ability to 
purchase web vulnerability kits and customize them for your exploits. 
 
Be Skeptical:  if it is too good to be true, then it usually is  
Web vulnerability kits [6] allow an attacker to gain control over client computers when 
they innocently access web sites hosting the malicious web exploitation kits.  The web 
servers are usually offering free software or games and more often than not, appear to 
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be too good to be true offers.  The web server will return malicious malcode as part of 
the innocent response expected by the client.  The newly downloaded malcode will 
begin a process of installing itself and may access other malicious servers to get more 
malcode.  Now the attacker is in complete control of the client machine and is able to 
steal personal information from the client and may add the client to a botnet for 
attacking other computers, possibly in a denial of services attack. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Web Vulnerability Kits have infected many popular websites [6] 
 
IDS – This will protect us, surely? 
 
Intrusion detection systems and firewalls are essentially a detection technology to keep 
attacks out of your network.  They Detect and Alert when there are unauthorised access 
and malicious activities detected in a network.  The problems with IDS systems is that 
it relies on a signature of an attack before the attack can be detected so this can lead to 
false positives and false negatives, a situation where network traffic is mistakenly 
blocked or permitted.  Also IDS system relies on being able to examine packet headers 
and payloads in the network traffic, but if encryption is used then it can not be read.  
Also hackers are constantly using new sophisticated evasion techniques to evade the 
network security systems.  
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Honeynets Overview 
 
Motivation 
The primary motivation to set up and run a Honeynet is to gather data from attacks and 
to try and understand the attacks.  The main issues are what tools are used, how are they 
used, by whom and why.  What are the tactics and motives of the hackers? 
 
Honeynet Types 
There are basically four types of Honeynet deployments; the high interaction Honeynet 
uses a real network of computers covering a wide variety of operating systems and 
architectures.  The low interaction Honeynets focus on a particular issue like a service 
attack while virtual Honeynets use a virtual network of computers to simulate a real 
network.  Finally distributed Honeynets are an amalgamation of several Honeynets 
geographically dispersed to study global attacks. 
 
History of Honeynet Project 
The Honeynet Project [7] began in 1999 by several security geeks (as they describe 
themselves) to investigate the activities of the “bad guys”.  Their goals were to learn 
about tools and techniques and develop new monitoring and counter-attack tools.  So 
much data was gathered that they found it difficult to find time to analyse it all so they 
created the “Scan of the Month challenge” and offered the data openly for anyone to 
have a go at investigating it.  This was so successful that they also created the “Reverse 
Challenge” competition which requires competitors to reverse engineer binary code to 
analyse malicious applications and code.  The Honeynet Project has grown into the 
Honeynet Research Alliance, a consortium of different academics and professionals 
that cooperate worldwide in the goals of the Honeynet project. 
 
Brief history of the Honeynets 
The Honeynet Project has further developed tools and methods from generation one 
(Gen-I) to the generation two (Gen-II (2002)) versions and freely distributed this 
software from their website.  The Gen-II tools have significant improvements and 
together with the benefits of running a Honeywall as a bridge with filtering intelligence 
give the following features: new tools like SNORT-INLINE, Sebek, rc.firewall, Virtual 
Honeypots, user interface for management and free bootable CD-ROM images, version 
1.1 and mostly recently (June 2007) version 1.2. 
 
The main advances in Honeynets are that as all traffic is suspicious, we have no false 
positives or false negatives, allow the collection of small data sets, allow the capture of 
encrypted activity, will work with IPv6, is highly flexible and requires minimum 
resources to setup and operate. 
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Honeynet Architecture 
 
 
Figure 3:  One possible layout of the Honeynet 
 
Honeynet Configuration 
 
Important configuration issues are the mode and IP information for the Honeywall, 
which is set to operate in bridged mode with identification as to which interface is 
operating as the external and internal bridge interface.  The IP address of the Honeynet, 
the LAN broadcast address and the LAN CIDR address is also needed. 
 
For remote management of the Honeynet, you need to enter the IP address and subnet 
of Honeypots, the Gateway address, Hostname, Domain name and DNS (if available), 
the manager IP address and any restriction on inbound / outbound traffic.  Finally the 
Walleye needs to be activated. 
 
Honeynet Operation 
The two essential parts of the Honeywall is data control and data capture.  Data Control 
is being able to provide containment of activity, to monitor inbound/outbound 
connections, have automatic alerting and the ability to block outward bound activity.  
Finally all the activities of the Honeywall must be difficult for attackers to detect. 
 
For Data Capture we require monitoring and logging of all activities and data with the 
challenge to collect as much data as possible without being detected.  The Honeywall is 
layered with the firewall provided by IPTables and the IDS storing full binary data 
captured of the network traffic using Snort-Inline.  When a Honeypot becomes infected, 
the attacker’s keystrokes are captured and stored on the Honeywall using Sebek. 
 
ITB Journal  
Issue Number 16, December 2007                                                     Page 10 
Before implementing a new Honeywall on a live Internet connection, the following 
steps should be followed with an offline network to check if Honeywall is working 
properly; 
 
1. Check if the IPTables logging mechanism is running correctly.  You can use a 
production host to open a telnet connection to the Honeypot.  Check to see if the 
connection recorded.  If so, now enable LAN blocking and try connection again. 
 
2. Check if IPTables are limiting outbound connections.  Make several HTTP 
connections to outside world and check the /var/log/messages file on Honeywall.  
There should be entries with limits noted.  Try UDP and ICMP protocols as well. 
 
3. Check Snort-Inline.  Use the test.rules file and include it in the configuration file 
and restart IPS.  Now open external telnet session, an HTTP connection and send 
pings.  Check snort-inline alert file for entries and note the dropping of packets and 
check snort in IDS mode (read data with tcpdump).  Finally check for email alerts 
(if set). 
 
Results from the Honeynet  
 
The ITB Honeynet was setup and configured in June 2007 with Honeypots running 
standard Windows XP and 2000 client installations.  We have found that the Honeypots 
get compromised very easily and often have to be replaced in the Honeynet so further 
forensics analysis of the exploit can be made offline.   
 
In this section, we present in detail the data from a typical day of activity on the 
Honeynet showing the large quantify of data that gets recorded and to give some idea of 
the types of processes used in an attack. 
 
A summary overview from the Walleye of the 24 hour period of activity is presented in 
figure 4.  It shows the following details: 
1. the identity of the Honeywall, date and time of activation and various other 
localisation information. 
2. the top 10 Honeypots 
3. the top 10 remote host connections 
4. the top 10 source ports and destination ports 
 
This summary information is taken from the recorded pcap packets recorded on the 
bridge between the Honeynet LAN and the Internet.  It is a snapshot of the activity on 
the Honeynet where no activity should be taking place.  The top 10 remote hosts are 
represented by IPv4 addresses so we can trace them on the Internet.  They are unlikely 
to be the real IP addresses of the attacker because he will have used a compromised 
computers to do his dirty work for him by activating it remotely and thus avoiding 
leaving a trail of evidence to him directly. 
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Figure 4:  Summary of Honeynet Activity for 24 hours 
 
Taking for example the traffic summary report for the 24 hours from the 2nd December 
to the 3rd December 2007 for detailed analysis, we find that 8,008 packets were 
processed with a total of 145 IDS events being recorded. The total inbound and 
outbound packet count is summarised in table 1. 
 
 
Connection 
Type 
Count Packets            
In 
Packets 
Out 
Bytes 
In 
Bytes 
Out 
Inbound 1256 1328 0 539359 0 
Outbound   8 16 16 0 0 
 
Table 1:  Packet Count for 24 hours 
 
The IDS on the Honeywall is configured to limit the number of packets allowed out 
from the Honeynet from a compromised Honeypot computer.  This prevents the 
compromised Honeypots from engaging in attacks on other computers while still 
allowing us to examine the attack process in action. 
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Remote IP Packets Bytes Conns 
207.145.74.21 16 0 8 
218.10.137.139 7 3199 7 
24.64.24.51 6 2904 6 
221.208.208.94 6 2742 6 
82.71.9.231 10 0 5 
221.209.110.50 5 2285 5 
62.193.242.99 6 4 4 
74.86.42.113 5 0 4 
87.67.249.225 4 0 4 
220.104.255.79 8 0 4 
 
Table 2:  Top 10 Remote IPs: 
 
The source IP addresses were recorded from the packets and these are summarised in 
table 3.  We can trace the origin of these IP addresses using whois utility on the 
Internet.  This shows that China and America are the most frequent sources of attacks.   
 
Remote IP Country 
207.145.74.21 United States of America 
218.10.137.139 China 
24.64.24.51 Canada 
221.208.208.94 China 
82.71.9.231 United Kingdom 
221.209.110.50 China 
62.193.242.99 Netherlands 
74.86.42.113 United States of America 
87.67.249.225 Belgium 
220.104.255.79 Japan 
 
Table 3:  Countries of origin 
 
The total number of ports scanned (destination ports) was 27 with details of the top ten 
scanned pots given in table 4 while in table 5 we can see the corresponding applications 
associated with the ports.  Typical attacks are on NetBIOS ports and HTTP ports as 
well as ping sweeps and MS-SQL attacks.  Table 7 and figure 5 show the complete 
range and frequency of activity on each of the ports.  UDP ports of 1026, 1027 and 
1028 contain the highest quantity of packets/bytes and connections.  The port of 1026 is 
used by the calendar access protocol and one can suppose that the attacker is trying to 
use some exploit in applications that use CAP to gain access to the Honeypot. 
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Port Packets Bytes Conns 
udp/1026 418 196110 418 
udp/1027 361 174164 361 
udp/1028 340 164560 340 
icmp/0 101 4197 54 
tcp/135 65 9 53 
tcp/139 29 0 14 
udp/1434 16 4516 14 
tcp/22 16 0 11 
tcp/445 16 0 8 
tcp/80 9 0 4 
 
Table 4:  Top 10 Scanned Ports: 
                  
Count SID Alert Description 
4 2 (spp_stream4) possible EVASIVE RST detection 
99   384 ICMP PING 
2 483 ICMP PING CyberKit 2.2 Windows 
2 525 BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic 
12 2003 MS-SQL Worm propagation attempt 
12 2004 MS-SQL Worm propagation attempt OUTBOUND 
2   2049 MS-SQL ping attempt 
12 2050 MS-SQL version overflow attempt 
 
Table 5:  All Snort Alerts 
 
Suspicious Connections: 
 
There is some evidence that the Honeypot has been compromised and has launched 
attacks on the other computers in the LAN.  This is indicated by suspicious activities 
taking place on the Honeypot even though no users or application services are using the 
Honeypot.  Some activity can be identified as belonging to operating system services 
that broadcast packets of notification and this can be easily identified and discarded.  
Other types of activity will require further forensic analysis.  Table 5 lists the serious 
activities on the Honeywall that have been detected by the intrusion detection system, 
Snort.  This list is typical of reconnaissance and footprinting activity performed by 
hackers.  The MS-SQL activity is also typical of a hacker trying to gain access to the 
system where they would try to download Malware or hacking tools to escalate 
privileges to account access and take over control of the computer. 
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Analysis of data for one week (2nd December to 9th December 2007) 
 
Details of the ports used in the Honeynet attacks. 
 
Port Packets Bytes Connect  
0 602 13,425 334 
Shirt Pocket netTunes. Shirt Pocket 
launchTunes. 
21 24 0 13 FTP, File Transfer Protocol, control. 
22 90 0 64 SSH. 
23 17 0 7 Telnet. 
25 27 0 13 SMTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. 
32 4 0 2  
53 5 0 5 DNS, Domain Name System. 
80 28 0 17 HTTP, HyperText Transfer Protocol. 
110 6 0 2 POP, Post Office Protocol, version 3. 
135 466 15 326 DCE endpoint resolution 
137 19 200 6 NETBIOS Name Service. 
139 140 0 65 NETBIOS Session Service. 
143 3 0 3 IMAP, Interactive Mail Access Protocol. 
443 23 0 14 HTTPS, HTTP over SSL/TLS. 
445 141 0 85 Microsoft-DS. 
1000 6 0 4 cadlock2 
1026 2,093 1,095,178 1,264 CAP, Calendar Access Protocol. 
1027 2,120 923,663 1,156 ExoSee. 
1028 1,965 860,552 1,074  
1070 4 0 2 AT+C License Manager. 
1080 0 3 0 Millicent Client Proxy. 
1433 46 0 25 Microsoft-SQL-Server. 
1434 64 13,164 37 Microsoft-SQL-Monitor. 
2967 8 0 5 Symantec System Center agent. 
3306 4 0 2 MySQL. 
3389 0 2 0 MS WBT Server. 
4899 5 0 5 RAdmin Port. 
5168 7 0 7 SCTE30 Connection. 
5900 25 0 13 VNC Server. 
6101 2 0 1 SynchroNet-rtc. 
8080 16 0 6 HTTP alternate. 
8999 4 0 2 Brodos Crypto Trade Protocol. 
10000 17 0 15 NDMP, Network Data Management Protocol. 
 
Table 6:  List of ports used for attacking Honeypot 
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Figure 5:  Plot shows the frequency of activity on each of the port numbers 
 
Conclusions and Future work  
 
We have shown how easy it is to setup a Honeynet using the Honeynet Project image 
software and we have collected data that has demonstrated how frequently a computer 
is attacked and through the suspicious connections we have shown that the basic 
operating system became infected and compromised on the first day of being 
connected. 
 
Under Irish law and International law, if your computer is used to attack another 
computer and gain unauthorised access, then you are responsible and libel for 
prosecution.  So it is important that we are aware of the dangers of being connected to 
the Internet and how these attacks are conducted and how to safeguard our computers 
from being compromised.   
 
When we compare our finding with the experiences of other Honeynets, for example 
the HEAnet Honeynet, we see much of the same activity on the detection level.  We are 
currently working on the forensics analysis of the compromised Honeypots where we 
are looking for answers to the questions like the following: 
 
• Is the attack real? 
• Who is committing the attack? 
• What is the timeline? 
• Identify all the malicious traffic involved in the attack for offline analysis 
• Is there a pattern to the attack? 
• What commands / tools were used? 
• Was a rootkit used? 
• Was an IRC channel used? 
• What exploits were used? 
• Was the honeypot comprised and used to initiate attacks? 
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We hope to have completed this work in a few months time and will follow up this 
paper with the results.   
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